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IV 
In 1974, Charles H. Sheldon summed up a debate within the 
political science fraternity between "traditionalists" and "behavi-
oralists." The debate appears to have peaked during the 1960s. He 
wrote: 
This debate has been leveled at the question of the use of values in research and 
at the methodologies common to the behavioralists. The dialogue takes a scientific 
versus non- or antiscientific perspective, with the behavioralist claiming that the 
traditionalist fails to be scientific enough, and the traditionalist arguing that the 
behavioralist confuses science with methodology. . . . Robert McCloskey has ob-
served " ... that the fraternity in general is now receptive to the methods and in-
sights ofbehavioralism in so far as it finds them helpful; ... and that the discipline 
is about ready for a new movement .... " 
The new movement is upon us. . . . The post-behavioral revolution in political 
science demands that we be concerned for the contemporary world and its problems 
even if we must sacrifice some of our scientific rigor. In Easton's words, " ... it is 
better to be vague than non-relevantly precise." . . . In describing, explaining, and 
predicting what is and eschewing the ought, [the behavioralist] tends to support the 
existing conditions in the world. The realties of the political world tend to be lost in 
the abstract context of models and data collection.l7 
It is not evident from Judicial Conflict and Consensus that its 
editors and contributors were daunted by Sheldon's last sentence. 
Because I was perplexed by my own inability to discern the purpose 
or utility of much of the research reported in the collection, I paid 
attention to the suggested agendas, in almost every chapter and in 
an epilogue, for "further research." Suspecting that the studies re-
ported were intended to be incremental, I hoped that the research 
agendas would help me to see the larger canvas on which they were 
to be increments. Unfortunately, however, most of the agendas 
called for more of the same. 
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Nearly thirty years ago, a biologist of my acquaintance, on 
learning that I planned to study philosophy, said something that 
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stuck in my mind. "I usually don't understand philosophers," he 
confessed, "and when I do understand what they've written I usu-
ally don't understand why they bothered to write it." His skepti-
cism, though expressed with unprofessorial directness, was not 
heretical. Similar doubts could be found in the latest writings of 
philosophers themselves, some of whom devoted their careers to 
demonstrating that metaphysics is invariably trivial, false, or ob-
scure. 
In those days, political philosophy was commonly regarded as 
a current in intellectual history, not a serious method for analyzing 
politics. That, I suspect, is still the average layman's view, but in 
the academy political philosophy is enjoying something of a vogue. 
This comeback, commonly attributed to the influence of John 
Rawls, is evident in the work of several constitutional theorists. 
Of course, there's philosophy and philosophy. Political philos-
ophy includes much more than the fantasies of Plato and company. 
Although lacking scientific rigor, men like Burke, Marx, and Bran-
deis were talking about how the world works. They may have been 
wrong; but they were neither trite nor theological. Despite patches 
of metaphysics, their emphasis was descriptive and utilitarian. 
Burke's Reflections may not persuade you, but he will at least open 
your eyes to some reasons for opposing "just" revolutions. Marx 
had great faults, but he will make you sensitive to the relationship 
between ideology and class interest. Brandeis may have exagger-
ated "the curse of bigness," but he was not just playing with words. 
As everyone knows, empiricism-whether petty or grand-
cannot answer all questions. In social research, the methodological 
problems are commonly so difficult that scholars disagree about 
how to interpret the results, as has happened, for example, with 
studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Fearful of 
methodological criticisms, social scientists often confine themselves 
to measuring gnats' eyebrows, achieving precision at the cost of util-
ity. The more fundamental problem is that most political quarrels 
are not amenable to empirical resolution. Even if capital punish-
ment does deter, many will still attack it as inhumane; and even if it 
doesn't, many will still applaud it as just. 
The inconclusive quality of empirical research does not neces-
sarily make it worthless. Given my prejudices, I may be swayed by 
a solitary fact. Still, we all yearn for something more, a system that 
will answer ultimate, normative questions. 
The attraction of thinkers like Rawls is that they hold out the 
promise-or seem to hold out the promise-of filling this epistemo-
logical void. But do they deliver the goods? Or was Bentham cor-
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rect when he described the metaphysics of rights as "nonsense on 
stilts"? 
Justice and Equality is a venture in Rawlsian thought. It con-
tains seven essays about distributive justice. The contributors are 
unusually distinguished: Judith Shklar, Charles Taylor, Allan 
Bloom, William Galston, G.A. Cohen, Michael Walzer, and Walter 
Berns. With such talented and politically varied authors, this book 
looks to be a fair test of the Rawlsian enterprise. 
Judith Shklar's introductory essay celebrates Rawls's achieve-
ment. He showed, she says, that "questions of great ethical ur-
gency, such as the proper balance between liberty and equality, 
could be discussed without the slightest loss of rational rigor or 
philosophical rectitude." Notice the ambiguities in her formula-
tion. Do "rational rigor" and "philosophical rectitude" imply util-
ity? If political theory is to be a kind of verbal chess, it will be 
rigorous but useless-similar, in that respect, to an overly refined 
empirical study. I don't mean to imply that political philosophy 
should be able to answer every practical question, or even that it 
should give a conclusive answer to any practical question. All I ask 
is that it tell me something I don't already know about a problem 
that interests me. Not necessarily something highly practical, but 
something interesting. Surely a collection of essays on equality 
should help me to decide, say, whether socialism is desirable. In 
constitutional terms, it should shed light on whether the Supreme 
Court ought to protect property rights, and whether poverty should 
be deemed a "suspect classification." 
Judged by that criterion, this book fails. Here, for example, is 
Professor Shklar's discussion of property rights: 
While in principle everyone says that the state of nature is a ridiculous fiction, it has 
not gone away. The reason is not hard to grasp. No one believes in Robinsonades, 
colonists without a past, or prepolitical peoples, but there must have been some-
thing, some other relationship among people and between people and the resources 
of the earth, before there was private property. Nothing can emerge from a void, 
after all. There was either communal ownership before private property was estab-
lished or no possession of resources at all. Since private property is justified in 
terms of its origins usually, there must be a before and after. Of course one may 
wonder if the first person who claimed to "own" an object was even Homo sapiens, 
though that person could and did defend it against all other claims. Property may 
be older than we are, but history has no bearing on the question. Social logic re-
quires an either-or choice, communal or private ownership. We left the former but 
may yet return to it. The state of nature remains a plausible alternative to every 
known historical society, and so it serves as an enduring mirror of possibilities. 
It would be unkind to analyze this passage line-by-line. Suffice 
it to say that when someone as eminent, as learned, and as moderate 
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as Judith Shklar comes so close to gibberish, we have a mystery 
worth pondering. 
No sensible person justifies the institution of private property 
"in terms of its origins." If political philosophers usually do so, 
that tells us a good deal more about political philosophers than 
about property rights. Private property is justifiable, if at all, 
chiefly on utilitarian grounds. Even in socialist countries, it seems 
to be a necessary concession to human selfishness. In capitalist 
countries, property rights are more extensive; they are essential to a 
market economy. If capitalism is preferable to any feasible alterna-
tive, then private property is desirable, although of course various 
regulations of it may also be desirable. The "state of nature" has no 
more bearing on these questions than it does on the contents of the 
law school curriculum. 
If the institution of private property is viewed as instrumental, 
then it is pointless to discuss fables about the state of nature and 
social contracts. One must study real-world capitalism and real-
world socialism and form conclusions about which system is more 
conducive to human well-being. In that endeavor, a sweaty journal-
ist-fresh out of Havana-may be equal or even superior to the 
most elegant dialectician at Yale. It is no accident, perhaps, that 
dialecticians prefer to discuss the state of nature. 
The book's second essay, by Charles Taylor, is called The Na-
ture and Scope of Distributive Justice. Professor Taylor, like Shklar, 
analyzes inequality by dispatching a straw man. His straw man is 
the theory that those who make a greater contribution to society-
surgeons, for example--deserve higher incomes than the rest of us. 
Now I suppose that many people do advance this justification for 
inequality; it may even be the most common justification. But it is 
also the easiest to refute. One might begin by questioning whether a 
surgeon makes a "greater contribution" than a garbageman. Defi-
nitional questions aside, the contribution argument, when stripped 
of all utilitarian overtones, is as weak as metaphysical justifications 
of property rights. As Taylor says (quoting Rawls): "(N]o one de-
serves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable 
starting place in society." "Atomist" modes of thought, Taylor tells 
us, "are all illusory." For "the talented individual who makes a 
valuable contribution owes much of his or her capacity to society. 
It is not just that the training without which this capacity could not 
flourish is often provided by the larger society, but also that the 
very fact that someone with this capacity can make a large contri-
bution may depend on a given mode of economy or social life." 
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And so on. Good points, surely, but not ones that a reasonable 
adult will have overlooked. 
Taylor does not discuss the most powerful economic argument 
for inequality, that it is an essential incentive. Nor does he address 
the most powerful sociological justification, that inequality is inevi-
table, given the wide variations in human talent. Had he done so, 
he would quickly have become mired in a morass of difficult real-
world issues, such as whether it would suffice to pay auto executives 
twice as much as masons and, if so, whether such a reduction in 
income disparities is politically feasible. Of all the justifications for 
inequality, he selects for rebuttal the argument that inequality is 
good in principle. This issue has the great advantage of requiring no 
factual research, but the great disadvantage of leading only to banal 
conclusions. It's like appraising monarchy by rebutting the divine 
right of kings. 
Taylor does acknowledge that a totally egalitarian society may 
not be appropriate. But, true to his vocation, he does so without 
mentioning any of the real-world phenomena associated with radi-
cal collectivism. He doesn't say that it is tyrannical, or that it leads 
to economic stagnation. He doesn't even say, in so many words, 
that inequality is a necessary incentive. The problem, in his ac-
count, is that the argument for egalitarianism "assumes a society we 
have not yet got." To scrap the contribution principle, says he, we 
would have to create 
a society in which the major good sought by the majority in engaging in economic 
activity was no longer individual prosperity, but, for example, some public goal, or 
the intrinsic satisfaction of the work itself; or else a society where people's needs 
were few and limited, and where production for the means to life had no interest 
beyond a certain modest level of prosperity, but where all surplus energies were 
devoted to other things, that is, the kind of society of which the ancients talked and 
Rousseau dreamed. 
Instead of drawing the obvious conclusion that no such utopia 
is attainable, Taylor advises us that one can try to achieve this soci-
ety in any of several ways: "The Marxist vision of the classless soci-
ety" is one possibility, "but there are others, such as the ideal of a 
commune life based on limited needs in some balance with nature." 
Professor Michael Walzer lashes out at another straw man. 
For him, private enterprise is obsolete. Why so? Because in early 
capitalism "all transactions, or by far the greater number of transac-
tions, can plausibly be talked about in the language of free ex-
change." This is no longer true: 
For corporations are-this is now a commonplace of American political science-
private government; their transactions are significantly political in character, taking 
the form of command and obedience rather than free exchange; their owners and 
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agents make decisions that determine the costs and the risks that other people must 
live with. 
Although corporate apologists deny that such "private govern-
ment" exists, "the denial is false" and so "justice requires that we 
challenge the exemption and explore systematically the alternatives 
to private government: public ownership and workers' control and 
various combinations of the two." 
Of course, even if old-fashioned capitalism was truly "free ex-
change," it may have been an inferior economic system; and even if 
modem capitalism is "private government," it may be a superior 
economic system. These labels raise false issues. The important 
question is what we will discover when, in Walzer's words, we "ex-
plore systematically" the differences between real capitalism and 
real socialism, and this is the question that is avoided, in Walzer's 
essay as in the others. 
Depending on one's political inclinations, the faults of political 
philosophy may seem more glaring in left-wing or in right-wing es-
says. But the characteristic weaknesses of the genre are not limited 
to thinkers of any particular persuasion; conservatives like Walter 
Berns employ some of the same rhetorical techniques that I have 
criticized in Walzer and Taylor. Berns's essay, Equally Endowed 
with Rights, is an eloquent defense of the Hamilton-Harlan thesis 
that the foundation of our liberty is the institutional structure estab-
lished by the original Constitution, more than the Bill of Rights. 
This argument, so contrary to a dominant assumption of modem 
constitutional thought, is a valuable counterweight to conventional 
discussions of rights. It exemplifies the best type of political philos-
ophy, grounded in reality and expounded by a master. 
Whether it can carry the weight that Professor Berns wants it 
to carry is another question. Berns's sonorous abstractions, like 
those of most political philosophers, often hover between platitude 
and falsehood, depending on how they are interpreted. He tells us, 
for example, that the founders realized that "there is no way, con-
sistent with natural right, that government can guarantee equal suc-
cess" in the pursuit of happiness. If we take this literally, it is the 
baldest of platitudes, a conservative's straw man. (Not even 
Michael Walzer would maintain that the government can guarantee 
equal happiness.) If we take it less literally, and perceive an innu-
endo that specific programs like food stamps for the poor are un-
wise, it ceases to be a platitude but becomes a non sequitur. (From 
the undoubted fact that "equal success" is unattainable, it is a very 
long leap to the conclusion that inequalities should not be allevi-
ated, which is all the justification any real-world proposal needs.) 
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Berns maintains that modern egalitarians favor "equality of 
condition rather than the equality of rights affirmed in the Declara-
tion of Independence and embodied in the Constitution." They do 
so because, unlike the framers, they refuse "to accept the political 
and social consequences of recognizing the respects in which people 
are by nature unequal." I happen to agree with that statement, and 
I'm happy to see it made. But of course it doesn't tell me anything 
useful about any particular issue. A debater could grant all of 
Berns's abstractions, yet defend the liberal side of every current so-
cial controversy. Comparable worth statutes, for example, are cus-
tomarily defended as exceptions to market principles. Similarly, 
racial criteria in admissions and hiring are defended as exceptions 
to traditional criteria. Berns and I may agree that these rationales 
are specious, and even occasionally insincere. If we can make a 
convincing argument to that effect, we don't need to invoke the 
framers' ideas about equality. And if we can't, it won't help to in-
voke the framers. 
The root fallacy of this book would have been obvious if its 
title had promised discussions of "poverty" instead of "equality." 
Poverty is a colossal problem; equality, except in contexts where it 
is merely a euphemism for poverty, or for severe oppression, is a 
relatively trivial issue. But "equality" connotes abstract justice; 
"poverty" connotes concrete suffering that cries out for remedies. 
If the topic is equality, one turns to philosophers; but poverty 
plainly calls for more worldly specialists-economists, agronomists, 
demographers, some down-to-earth sociologists, and politicians. 
They must answer dozens, if not hundreds, of practical questions, 
some of which are very large and complex. How much inequality, 
and of what sorts, is needed as an incentive to achievement? What 
are the political limits on soaking the rich in a capitalist democracy? 
Do these limits differ as between small, homogeneous societies like 
Sweden and large, heterogeneous ones like the United States? Do 
they differ, at bottom, from the difficulties of reducing the privileges 
of Soviet officials? How should redistribution be carried out? To 
what extent does it necessarily entail loss of civil liberties and in-
deed of democracy itself? What are its other costs? Are the poor 
better off in socialist countries? Is the average man? 
Such books have been written. But not, so far as I know, by 
philosophers. It would be a good project for one of the contributors 
to Justice and Equality. 
